

SECURITY INFORMATION

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**POTENTIAL GAINS TO OR DRAINS ON THE SOVIET BLOC'S FOOD
SUPPLY WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM THE ACQUISITION OF CONTINENTAL
WESTERN EUROPE**

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

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FOOD AND AGRICULTURE - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

An evaluation has been made of the food supply situation in Continental Western Europe and of the Soviet Bloc according to the assumptions set forth in the proposed outline for NIE-40. Attention has been given to the specific gains to the Soviet Bloc if the conditions underlying this study should prevail, and to the capacity of the Soviet Bloc to supply from its own resources the food deficits of Western Europe.

In addition to the general assumptions which have been established for this study, the following additional assumptions pertaining to the production, collection, and distribution of food have been made:

(a) Average weather conditions will prevail during the period under consideration.

(b) The farm population (representing about 33 percent of the total population) will retain legally or otherwise enough food to supply around 3,200 calories daily for each member of the family. It is doubtful that during the period involved the Soviets could establish an administrative organization which would be capable of enforcing a more stringent delivery program if they desired to do so.

(c) Approximately 27 percent of the total population (40 percent of the non-farm population) will be engaged in industrial or other work regarded by the Soviets as essential and will receive an average of 3,000 calories per person per day. This is a very broad category including heavy workers (i.e., miners) receiving 4,000 or more calories daily down to and including light workers consuming daily considerably less than 3,000 calories, and also including administrative and police officials, assumed to be largely party members, on relatively good rations.

Currently, the main deficits of Western Europe are grains and fats and oils; imports in recent years amounted to around 7.5 million metric tons of bread grains, 5.5 million tons of coarse grains, and 1.5 million tons of fats and oils. After the occupation of Western Europe there will be major changes in the patterns of food production and utilization, in order to obtain more food calories from indigenous resources and thus partially offset import losses. These shifts will involve planting larger acreages to food crops, larger consumption of grain for food, higher milling extraction rates (more flour and less by-products available for feed) of grains used for food. Because of these shifts and the cessation of feed grain imports, a reduced output and consumption of livestock products will take place by 1953-54, though during the first year of occupation, the available supply of meat and slaughter fats will be increased due to increased slaughter of livestock. These changes will result in diets of inferior quality, particularly after 1952-53.

Despite the expected drastic changes in production and consumption patterns, there are likely to be deficits of from 2.5 to 3.5 million metric tons of bread grains in 1952-53 and from 5.5 to 6 million tons in 1953-54; in the second year of occupation the fat shortage is expected to reach major proportions.

The impact of Soviet occupation upon Western Europe will vary considerably from country to country unless there is a redistribution of food among the various countries. The more deficit countries, including Austria, Western Germany, Belgium, Norway, and Switzerland, normally produce no more than 1,900 to 2,000 calories per person per day and import, on the average, about one-half of their bread grain requirements, ranging from

40 percent in Western Germany to almost 90 percent in Norway. Thus, without imports of bread grains, these countries would face a serious food shortage before the end of the 1952-53 consumption year. None of the countries in Western Europe, excluding Denmark, is a net exporter of food or even self-sufficient in food and feed production at present levels of production and consumption. On a weighted average Western Europe normally consumes around 2,800 calories per person per day of which about 75 to 80 percent is obtained from indigenous supplies.

The first year of occupation

During the first year of occupation of Western Europe (assumed to be the 1952-53 consumption year), it is estimated that total food supplies available from indigenous production and stocks on hand will supply an average of around 2,500 to 2,600 calories per person per day if none of these supplies is requisitioned for shipment to Eastern Europe or for use by occupation forces. This represents an increase of 300 to 500 calories per person per day over the supply available from domestic production under normal production and utilization patterns.

There will be net surplus quantities of certain foods in Western Europe which include about 850,000 metric tons of sugar, 500,000 tons of meat, 180,000 tons of cheese and 150,000 tons of eggs. In addition to the above net surpluses for the area as a whole, there would be local surpluses in some countries of bread grains, fats and fish. On the basis of the overall food supply positions in Eastern and Western Europe, it seems likely that the Soviet Union would requisition for its own needs substantial quantities of the above commodities.

On the other hand, there will be serious food deficits in several Western European countries, chiefly of bread grains, which, in some cases, would be aggravated by the assumed confiscation of local non-grain surpluses by the Soviets. To bring the average rations for the non-priority urban consumer group (other than essential workers) in these deficit countries to around 1,600 to 1,700 calories, it would be necessary that they import from outside sources from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to $3\frac{1}{2}$ million tons of grain; this estimate is based on the assumption that a large portion of the surplus commodities mentioned above would be requisitioned by the Soviets. A portion of the grain deficit could probably be met through shipments from a few Western European countries, but most of the deficit would have to come from Eastern Europe.

On balance, considering the quality of Western European surpluses, that area could not be regarded as a net liability to the Soviet Bloc during the first year of occupation insofar as food is concerned.

The second year of occupation

During the second year of occupation (1953-54) the food deficit in Western Europe would be considerably greater than during the first year due primarily to reduction in stocks and production. Under conditions which are expected to prevail during Soviet occupation of Western Europe, it is probable that the total output from the soil will not remain at prewar levels. However, with a reduction in the total agricultural output, but an increase in the proportion used for direct human consumption, it is estimated that domestic food production in the Western European countries in the year 1953-54 will be in the order of 2,200 to 2,300 calories per person per day. On the basis of assumptions b. and c. on page 1, it is estimated that the food surplus available to the non-priority segment of

the population would be from 900 to 1,100 calories per person per day. If the occupying power should want to increase the food supply for the non-priority group estimated at around 40 percent of the total population or around 98 million people, it would require slightly more than one million metric tons of wheat equivalent for each 100 calorie increase in the daily rations. To increase the average rations for the non-priority group to around 1,600 to 1,700 calories daily would require annual imports of around 6.5 to 7.5 million tons of wheat equivalent. From 5.5 to 6.0 million tons of this deficit would be in the form of grain; the balance of the deficit would be largely one of fats and oils.

It is estimated that during the second year of occupation Western Europe may have relatively small net "surpluses" of certain food commodities, including about 150,000 metric tons of sugar, 300,000 tons of meat, 100,000 tons of cheese, and 50,000 tons of eggs. If these or other quantities of foods should be requisitioned by the occupying forces, the deficits and import needs of Western Europe as a whole would be increased accordingly.

On balance, Western Europe will be a liability, insofar as food is concerned, during the second year of occupation.

Potential food exports from the Soviet Bloc

On the assumption that priority groups (workers and farmers) in Western Europe would receive reasonably satisfactory ration allowances and that the remaining population would receive subsistence allowances, it would be necessary to import from 2.5 to 3.5 million metric tons of grain during the first year of occupation and 5.5 to 6.0 million tons the second year. It is estimated that under normal weather conditions grain will be available from harvests of the respective years and/or reserve stocks to supply these

requirements. However, the net quantity of food which would be shipped from Eastern Europe will depend upon the unpredictable policies of the Kremlin and upon the availability of transportation facilities. There would be a serious shortage of fat in Western Europe, particularly during the second year of occupation, which is unlikely to be covered from Eastern European supplies. Part of the fat deficit in Western Europe could be met from Manchurian soybean oil if it should be decided that the fat deficit endangers industrial production and justifies the use of limited transportation facilities for transferring Manchurian soybean oil to Western Europe.